loan guarantees

Three years of freedom of information act (FOIA) requests by the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE), along with a fair bit of litigation when FOIA docs came back mostly black with redactions, have met with some success.  SACE's efforts have unearthed a sizeable cache of documents related to the construction of two new nuclear reactors at Plant Vogtle in Georgia and the $8.33 billion conditional loan guarantee by the US Department of Energy that would finance a big chunk of the deal.  While the funding on offer is commonly referred to as a loan guarantee, it is actually a direct government loan:  the Federal Financing Bank, part of the US Treasury, is the source of the funds. 

Earth Track and Synapse Energy Economics teamed up to take a first look at the release documents.  Despite widespread redactions (many pages were still mostly black; critical data on key inputs underlying DOE's credit risk estimates were systematically blocked as well), there was nonetheless quite a bit there.  You can read the full study here, and other study-related documents such as the press release and conference, and links to key documents, can be accessed here.  Some key findings are below.

• Indications of involvement in the loan guarantee process and terms by political appointees. Top political appointees in the Departments of Energy, Labor, and Treasury were directly involved to make the deal a go.  The White House was also involved.  DOE staff were under pressure to expedite the deal as well.  An e-mail from December 2010 points to unspecified communication between the White House and the Nuclear Energy Institute over issues of concern. (In this and other cases, extensive redactions in the FOIA documents make the precise focus of the meetings and discussion unclear.)  An email from February 2010 notes that DOE did not “deal” with Shaw [the firm slated to do much of the reactor construction]; rather, “the [W]hite [H]ouse did.” Efforts for DOE to close out consultation, most likely on loan terms, was handled “at the political level” of the Department of the Treasury, according to another email. Emails from DOE staff indicate that Secretary Chu was involved in discussions with key Vogtle Project players over loans details as well. “MEAG’s CEO, Bob Johnston got a call on Friday from Secretary Chu and they discussed the progress that had been made with Southern and where we stood on our [the MEAG] term sheet negotiation,” read one email. These contacts and interventions were a potentially troubling blurring of financial risk review, political discussion, and potential modification of loan terms.
  
  We don't know how these contacts affected the terms of the deal.  However, the bigger the pile of money on the table, the more transparent the decision process should be, and the more completely financial analysis must be separated from political and policy goals in driving funding decisions.  These divisions were not properly respected, even though taxpayer support to Vogtle 3&4 is a big pile of money indeed:  by far the largest of DOE's Title XVII loan guarantee program, and much larger than funding through other venues such as venture capital investment in energy and export credit support via the Export Import Bank. 
• Credit subsidy payments appear too low to offer adequate protection to taxpayers in the event of a default. A key taxpayer protection under Title XVII is an up-front payment borrowers make to DOE to cover the expected risk of default.  Yet, it is clear that the most current estimates for these payments are unlikely to provide adequate protection for taxpayers.  Even the high estimate for Georgia Power ($52 million), for example, would add only about 1/8% to borrowing costs over the life of the loan. This increment, which is supposed to protect taxpayers from the risk of default on the first nuclear reactors built in the U.S. in 30 years, is likely less than the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) markup on the loan relative to the Department of the Treasury’s base cost of borrowing.  While the other investment partners were offered a conditional loan guarantee with substantially higher credit subsidy fees than Georgia Power, they were still not protective of taxpayers. Oglethorpe Power’s fee was 2.5-4.3% for a range of $70-132 million and MEAG’s fee was 5-11.1% for a range of $108-186 million.  The top end of this range is still lower than the average credit subsidy rate assumed on other Title XVII commitments, according to data from the US Government Accountability Office last year.
• Favorable repayment terms.  Taxpayer risk was also increased by loan repayment terms that allow Georgia Power to repay no principal at all on its multi-billion dollar loan until years 29 and 30 of the loan term.  Oglethorpe and MEAG do repay principal over the course of the loan, but assuming 40-year amortization period even though the loan term is only 30 years.  As a result, both will still owe substantial principal to DOE at the end of the loan term, requiring refinancing.  This structure increases the time over which the borrowers benefit from taxpayer subsidies on borrowing, and increases nonpayment risk to taxpayers should something on the project go wrong.
• Stale credit subsidy values. Over the past two years, there have been continuing changes to the loan terms, a deteriorating power market, and widespread changes in the prospects and operating procedures for nuclear power following the Fukushima accident.  All of these shifts would be expected to change the projected default risks of the Vogtle project.  Yet the DOE and OMB have both stated that there have been no subsequent adjustments to credit subsidy estimates to incorporate these market and deal shifts. 
• Over-reliance on external contractors for key risk evaluations. DOE appears not to have built sufficient analytic tools and staff expertise internally to properly assess credit risks and deal structure. 
• Inadequate control of credit subsidy assessment process. Credit subsidy values were issued to borrowers before the credit subsidy model was finalized, and there is some indication that Vogtle Project borrowers may have been given access to the analytic models DOE used to assess credit risks and subsidy rates.  

All told, the documents released do not generate confidence that decisions have been made in a systematic, objective, and independent way; or that the more than $8 billion that taxpayers are putting at risk is being adequately protected.  Press coverage of our study has been fairly broad, and in a number of the stories Southern Company officials have noted that the project is not dependent on federal loan guarantees to continue. 

DOE ought to take Southern up on this statement.  Having Vogtle 3 and 4 move forward without Title XVII loan guarantees would certainly be a good outcome for taxpayers, as we bear much of the risk of default but share none of the upside if the project is successful.  However, I think that self-financing the deal would actually be better for the long-term viability of the nuclear industry as well.  True:  eliminating subsidized Title XVII loans will still leave many other props to the project in place:  advance nuclear surcharges on Georgia Power customers -- Georgia's form of CWIP; long-term take-or-pay power purchase agreements that remain in force even if the plant is never completed; more than $2 billion in tax-advantaged Build America Bonds; and access to existing nuclear subsidies in the form of production tax credits, socialized nuclear waste management, tax favored nuclear decommissioning trusts, and liability caps on accidents.  But demonstrating they can tap into private capital markets for the rest would help establish a more replicable financing model going forward.  

Houston-based DKRW Advanced Fuels has a dream:  they want to turn a chunk of Wyoming's vast coal reserves into 10,600 barrels of gasoline per day.  They want to capture most of the carbon emitted in the process and sell it to the state's oil and gas industry, which will use the CO2 to inject into wells, increasing oil and gas production.  In one fell swoop, the firm hopes to boost production of all of the state's major fossil fuels.  The facility would be located near Medicine Bow, a town that presently has about 300 people.

Dreaming with somebody else's money

Oh, and part of the dream that they don't broadcast quite so loudly is that they want to do it mostly with our money.  The firm has an application in with DOE for a $1.7 billion loan guarantee, which passed DOE preliminary review in 2009.  And they've recently gotten approval from the Carbon County Commission to issue $245 million in tax exempt bonds.  This debt is guaranteed by the project not by the County, but subsidized by taxpayers because the interest is free from taxation.  It will also use up most of the state's annual alotment to issue tax exempt, non-municipal bonds. 

There's more at the subsidy salad-bar:  the Commission also unanimously endorsed issuing $300 million in industrial development bonds, which DKRW has asked the state's Permanent Mineral Trust Fund to purchase.  From time-to-time, the Trust Fund does invest in Wyoming-based enterprises, and DKRW has indicated that they think their plant should be one of them.

The venture is also being supported by $10 million in state funding to support pre-construction studies both for the DKRW facility, and another project under consideration within WY that would convert natural gas into vehicle fuels. 

Bob Kelly, executive chairman of DRKW, is happy so far with the state's involvement.  As noted in a recent story in the Casper Star-Tribune, Kelly

said the bonds are "very helpful" in assembling the $1.7 billion to $2 billion needed to finance the plant's construction.  Kelly said the company is seeking bank financing to cover the rest of the plant's cost [emphasis added].

Where's the equity?

Billions at risk, leveraged from other people.  This should always be a flag that extreme due diligence is needed.  The fact that the entire top management team at DKRW Advanced fuels (Robert Kelly, Jon Doyle, William Gathman, Jude Rolfe, Robert Moss, and Wade Cline) are out of Enron does nothing to ameliorate the concern. 

Kelly's statement also begs the question "where's the equity"?  DOE's guarantees require a minimum of 20% equity investment.  It's not from DOE.  It's not in the tax-exempt bonds, and it's not in the "bank financing to cover the rest of the plant's cost."  That, perhaps, leaves the $300m that DKRW is trying to get the state of Wyoming to plow in.  That funding seems to be structured like debt, because there is no mention of the state getting a stake in the company for the money.  It is clearly like risk capital in terms of the investment it is supporting, however.  Nonetheless, the limited equity requirement under the DOE program was focused on aligning the incentives of managers with the venture's success by requiring them to have "skin in the game." Government money wouldn't seem to cut it.

To it's credit, Wyoming is approaching the investment with some caution.  The Treasurer's Office has requested input on deal soundness from the Wyoming Business Council, which in turn has asked for a technical review from Idaho National Laboratory.  Mike Martin, at the Business Council, did not think the INL review went beyond technical issues to include as well a review of the financial suitability of the project for the state's Mineral Trust Fund. He was also not clear whether the INL review would examine systemic risk factors, such as what would happen to plant economics should a price or cap on carbon emissions be instituted.  INL's review should look at both of these items, as federal and Wyoming taxpayers will have lots at risk if this plant moves forward with so much public subsidy.

A second check to the spending comes from the legislature.  An investment of $300m would require Legislative approval, making it more difficult to put state funds at risk foolishly.  However, investments up to $100 million would not, and State Senator Phil Nicholas, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, has said the leadership would be comfortable with buying $50 to $100 million of the bonds.  As evident from the table below, even at these lower levels, the funding would materially alter the Trust Fund's asset allocations and DKRW would comprise one of its largest, non-diversified investments.

DKRW investment conflicts with the purpose of the Permanent Mineral Trust Fund

To look at the issue of financial suitability, I pulled existing data on the state's Permanent Mineral Trust Fund (summarized in the table below).  The purpose of this fund, and many others like it around the world, is simple:  mandate a portion of mineral revenues to go into an investment fund for the benefit of future residents of the resource-producing region -- be it a county, a state, or an entire country.  This solves two problems at once.  First, the mandate removes from political control at least part of the massive cash flow that comes from resource booms.  Without such a mandate, the potential benefits of resource booms were often lost as politicians squandered the surge in funds on foolish projects, empire building, or corruption.  Second, the Trust Fund approach requires an independent fund manager to invest in a widely diversified set of assets.  The income and growth of these other assets reduce the correlation between energy or mineral prices and the available revenues to the state, helping to dampen the boom-bust resource cycles as well. 

Based on the criteria for which the Mineral Trust Fund was established, investing in DKRW should be immediately rejected, even at funding levels well below the requested $300m.  Regardless of whether INL decides the plant is technically sound, the investment further concentrates Wyoming's financial exposure to energy prices rather than diversifying away from them, and therefore works counter to the intent of the Mineral Trust Fund. 

Further, as shown below, the scale of investment is far more concentrated that what currently exists in the Fund's portfolio.  At first blush, a $300m investment in the plant may not seem like a big deal, comprising well less than 10% of more than $5 billion in total holdings of the Trust Fund.  Yet, for any of the conceivable asset classes in which the investment could fit, exposure to DKRW would dominate the class, comprising at least than 2/3 of the resultant asset class sizing (current size plus DKRW holding) in every case.  This metric actually understates the risk since the existing portfolio has many small investments, rather than large lumpy ones like the proposed holding in DKRW.

I looked at four potential asset categories in which DKRW could possibly fit.  Because the investment would be debt with no equity interest, I considered corporate bonds.  However, the risk of this venture is far higher than what a normal corporate bond portfolio would entail; and if I were the Treasurer, I would require equity interests as well.  If we assume the state were to get an equity interest as well, conceivably small- to mid-sized (SMID) US equity would be an asset-class fit.  But again, the risk is higher than what a SMID portfolio would normally entail due to the high technology risks of the plant, and the investment would have some elements of debt rather than being pure equity.  Private equity is probably the best match in terms of risk level -- though one that would require much higher returns to the state than what is likely being considered at present. 

The final category considered was intra-Wyoming investments.  Like the other possible categories, DKRW would come to dominate the WY holdings at a $300m sizing.  Not only would be the size of the investment be larger than what currently exists within the intra-WY holdings, but many of the existing investments benefit multiple firms or people, not a single project.  Many of these projects also have a clear public interest component (beyond simple job creation), something that DKRW investment does not.

For additional reading on the planned DKRW coal-to-gasoline plant in Medicine Bow, Wyoming Public Radio just did an interesting series of reports.  Taxpayers for Common Sense also has a good backgrounder.  Update, 2/16:  An interesting op-ed in the Casper Tribune by Jason Lillegraven goes into some detail on problems with the environmental assessments done on the project to date, particularly with regards to water consumption.  For so many of these facilities, water is the achilles heel.  Too often, the facilities pay little or nothing for the amount of water they use.  Just as running a sensitivity on project returns assuming CO2 emissions won't always be free, it would be prudent to do the same with water.